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Pests on a plane – airports and the fight against infectious disease  
(Published in Airports of the World July-August:48-53 Stamford, Key Publishing) 
 
Lucy Budd 
 
Regular flyers are all too aware that air travel can, on occasion, be bad for your 
health. Jetlag, deep vein thrombosis (DVT), airsickness, dehydration, ear pain, and 
respiratory infections are just some of the conditions that are reported. Yet while seat-
based exercises, air conditioning filters, flight socks, earplugs, boiled sweets, 
inflatable pillows, and eyeshades may lessen some of the risks and discomfort 
associated with flying, the warm, pressurised, sealed cabins of passenger aircraft 
continue to offer the perfect environment in which certain pests and diseases may 
thrive and spread. Medical journals are replete with stories of airline passengers 
contracting a range of infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, meningitis, measles, 
and influenza, from fellow (infected) travellers, while the rapid spread of the SARS 
virus to over 25 countries around the world in 2003 was attributed, in part, to the 
long-haul airline network. Since the birth of commercial aviation at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, airports have found themselves at the forefront of a worldwide 
battle against the spread of tropical and infectious diseases, and a range of public 
health interventions have been deployed to try and prevent pests and diseases being 
transported around the world aboard aircraft. This article reviews some of the public 
health directives that were devised to prevent the spread of disease by air and explains 
their implications for the design and operation of airports. 
 
The early years 
While the globalisation of infectious disease is not a new phenomenon, commercial 
aviation posed a new and challenging set of global public health issues. For the first 
time, passengers could board an aircraft in one country and alight in a distant land a 
few hours later; journeys that had once taken weeks or months to complete by land 
could now be accomplished in a matter of hours by air. As a consequence, diseases 
that had once been the exclusive preserve of the tropics began spreading to new 
regions of the world along the contours of the global airline network. The realisation 
that aircraft could be vectors of human disease led to the development of specific 
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sanitary regulations for aviation and the implementation of new public health 
directives at airports, some of which continue to be practiced today. 
 
One of the earliest recorded examples of a disease being transported from one country 
to another by air occurred in 1918 when an English fighter pilot inadvertently 
reintroduced rabies into the United Kingdom as a consequence of bringing an infected 
dog into the country aboard his aircraft. The inauguration of regular cross-Channel 
passenger flights in 1919 increased the potential for diseases to be spread, and fines 
were introduced to deter passengers from trying to import animals without a licence. 
As airlines grew, and new long-distance routes were added to the network, passengers 
and crew were faced with a new and increasing range of exotic diseases, including 
yellow fever, typhus, and malaria, for which they had no natural immunity. There was 
also concern that passengers travelling from endemic smallpox or cholera areas in 
Africa and Asia could reintroduce diseases that had been effectively eradicated in 
Europe. To reduce the risk of contracting infection, passengers and crew on long-haul 
services were encouraged to sleep under mosquito nets, and curtains impregnated with 
insecticide were hung over aircraft doorways to try and prevent insects from flying in. 
 
Though slow by modern standards, the speeds attained by early passenger aircraft in 
the late 1920s and 1930s revolutionised notions of time and distance and enabled 
many parts of the world to be reached by air within the incubation period of major 
infectious diseases. Cholera, which was endemic in India and Iraq at this time, had an 
incubation period of 2-5 days, several days longer than the minimum journey time 
from these places to Europe by air. Likewise, the incubation period of Plague (2-6 
days) was considerably less than the flight time from endemic areas in East Africa (4 
days) and India (4-5 days), and passengers could fly from endemic yellow fever zones 
to Europe in as little as three days, the same duration as the minimum known 
incubation period of the disease. The situation was even more pronounced for 
smallpox and typhus, which had far longer incubation periods. During the mid-1930s, 
the flight time from endemic smallpox and typhus areas in the Middle East and 
Central Europe respectively was approximately ten days shorter than the incubation 
period of the two diseases. This meant that infected travellers could potentially fly 
back to Europe with no symptoms, pass health and customs officials at the airport, 
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and spread the disease amongst their community before a diagnosis could be made or 
treatment started. 
 
The airport, the aerial gateway through which diseases could be introduced into new 
territories, was identified as a place of significant risk, and individual countries began 
taking steps to monitor the health of incoming airline passengers. However, in light of 
the somewhat haphazard and inconsistent measures that were applied in different 
regions of the world, it was decided that internationally binding procedures governing 
the health of airline passengers and the sanitation of airports and airlines should be 
devised. 
 
The first Sanitary Conventions  
The international community began taking the first tentative steps towards the 
internationalisation of sanitary measures for aviation in the mid 1920s.  The first 
multilateral international health agreement to deal with aviation appeared in 1924 as a 
result of the 7
th
 Pan American Sanitary Conference that was held in Havana. Here, 
delegates from countries in North, Central, and South America signed a Sanitary Code 
which called for the adoption of measures to “prevent the introduction and spread of 
disease” into other territories by air. In April 1933, the First International Sanitary 
Convention for Aerial Navigation was convened in The Hague. The resulting 
Convention, which became effective in August 1935, contained 67 separate Articles 
and dealt with threats posed by Typhus, Smallpox, Plague, Cholera, and Yellow 
Fever. The possibility of medical inspection of passengers and the control of tropical 
diseases were discussed, and detailed methods concerning the eradication of insects – 
especially the mosquito that transmitted Yellow Fever – in and around airports were 
proposed.  
 
In addition to fulfilling certain aeronautical operating requirements, the Convention 
stipulated that designated “sanitary aerodromes” had to have a dedicated medical 
facility staffed by trained physicians in which medical inspections of passengers could 
be carried out and where travellers with suspected cases of infection could be isolated 
and treated. Separate lavatories had to be provided for the two sexes and, if possible, a 
scientific laboratory for the bacterial analysis of medical samples constructed on site. 
Sanitary airports also had to be able to guarantee supplies of clean drinking water and 
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have suitable facilities in which human waste and other refuse could be safely and 
hygienically disposed. To keep the aerodrome free from mosquito infestation, 
powerful insecticides were regularly sprayed over the airfield and its immediate 
environs to try and disrupt the breeding cycle of the insects. In endemic yellow fever 
areas, preventative measures were taken a step further. Designated ‘anti-amaryl’ 
aerodromes had to be sited at least one mile windward of all human habitation, all 
buildings for staff and passengers had to be insect-proof, and an isolation area in 
which potential air passengers could be kept under observation for up to six days 
before embarkation had to be provided.  
 
All aircraft engaged on international services were also required to carry a logbook in 
which all matters relating to public health were entered. Upon arrival, the commander 
of the aircraft was responsible for informing the airport’s resident medical officer of 
any suspected cases of infection amongst the passengers or crew. Departing air 
passengers, meanwhile, could be required to submit to a medical examination prior to 
boarding, and the aerodrome’s medical officer was empowered to prevent any person 
who showed signs of infection from flying. The medical officer was also responsible 
for ensuring that no infected bedding, clothing, or cargo was loaded onto the flight 
and that the aircraft itself was free from rodent and insect infestation. 
 
Faster jets and new disease threats 
In 1944, in anticipation of the post-war growth in commercial air travel, a revised 
Sanitary Convention for aviation was devised. This document called for ‘special 
measures to prevent the spread by air across frontiers of epidemic or other 
communicable diseases’. The modified Convention introduced new documentation in 
the form of aircraft and passenger health declarations, international certificates of 
inoculation against Cholera, Yellow Fever, Typhus Fever and Smallpox, and 
certificates of immunity against Yellow Fever. The required number of inoculations 
now depended both on the route that was to be flown and an individual passenger’s 
personal vaccination and travel history. Upon arrival, it was the responsibility of 
airport officials to check the validity of these certificates and offer vaccination to 
passengers with incorrect or invalid documentation. This naturally increased the time 
taken to process passengers in the arrivals hall. 
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Though it was hoped that the revised 1944 Sanitary Convention would set the 
standard for disease control measures around the world only 14 countries, including 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, ratified the amendments. Other 
countries continued to take few if any precautions, while others imposed restrictions 
that went far beyond what was required. In light of the different medical requirements 
individual countries demanded and the inconsistencies involved in their policing, 
airlines advised passengers to be inoculated against every conceivable disease. This 
reportedly led to confusion, resentment, and excessive inoculation, with prospective 
travellers being forced to submit to multiple injections. Not only was this time 
consuming, expensive and very bureaucratic, the regulations were frequently 
undermined by fraudulent documentation and passengers who deliberately made false 
health declarations to avoid being detained for further health checks at the airport. 
 
Given these problems, a pan-global directive aimed at controlling the spread of 
disease by air was enshrined in Chapter II Article 14 the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation. Here, each contracting State agreed  ‘to take effective 
measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus 
(epidemic), smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and other communicable diseases’ and 
agreed to consult with international public health organisations and share 
epidemiological data on diseases. 
 
The 1950s and 1960s represented important decades in the development of sanitary 
regulations for air travel. Though the introduction of more effective insecticides, 
preventative vaccines, and new methods of treatment helped facilitate the control of 
plague, typhus, and urban yellow fever, a new generation of faster, longer-range jet-
powered aircraft brought the temperate regions of Europe and North America 
metaphorically even closer to the endemic centres of tropical disease. Throughout the 
remainder of the twentieth century the sanitary regulations governing aerial 
navigation were continually revised and updated in light of advancing medical 
knowledge and the emergence of new diseases. Regulations regarding the movement 
of non-human cargoes were also strengthened in recognition that aircraft could also 
introduce alien (and often highly destructive) plant and animal pests into new areas. 
To counter such threats, a raft of legislation, from pet passports to phytosanitary 
certificates and importation licences have been devised to protect the biosecurity of 
 6 
national borders by regulating the movement of global flora and fauna through 
airports. When one considers that the animal reception centre at Heathrow airport 
alone handles in excess of 35 million fish, and hundreds of different species of birds, 
mammals, reptiles, and amphibians every year, the need for vigilance is obvious. Yet, 
in addition to these ‘documentary’ interventions that seek to intercept potentially 
harmful shipments at airports, more direct practices of disease control using powerful 
insecticides are also practised. 
 
Disinsection 
The legal basis for eradicating insects and other stowaways in aircraft, or 
‘disinsection’ as it was termed, through the application of pesticides and insecticides, 
was enshrined in Article 5(e) of the 1933 Sanitary Convention. This Article decreed 
that all sanitary aerodromes must have at their disposal the ‘apparatus necessary for 
carrying out disinfection, disinsectisation and deratisation’ of aircraft in order to 
prevent the spread of disease. 
 
Airlines had first attempted to address the problem of insects travelling aboard their 
aircraft in equatorial regions in the late 1920s, but most of the hand-held sprays they 
used were largely ineffective. Under the direction of their senior medical adviser, 
Imperial Airways’ Experimental production section at Battersea in London devised a 
more effective system of aircraft disinsection. The Phantomyst Electrical 
Disseminator or Phantomyst Vaporiser discharged a fine, dry, near odourless cloud of 
Pyrethrum-based insecticide into the passenger cabin. The device reportedly left no 
unpleasant odour, did not stain clothing or upholstery, and was considered harmless to 
humans. Furthermore, the insecticide was not flammable and did not damage the 
structure of the aircraft. An alternative system, the ‘Larmouth carbon dioxide sparklet 
method’, was also developed and, in order to assess the relative performance of the 
two devices, both were installed in Imperial Airways’ flying-boats Cassiopeia and 
Cambria on the Southampton to Durban route with apparently satisfactory results.  
 
Today, despite concerns about the toxicity and human health implications of exposure 
to chemical insecticides, over 35 countries around the world still require commercial 
aircraft to be routinely disinsected, arguing the practice is necessary to protect public 
health, domestic agriculture, and native ecosystems from alien pests and diseases.  
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Four different methods of aircraft disinsection are currently approved by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), and include blocks away, top of descent, on arrival, and 
‘residual’ treatment. Residual treatment, in which insecticide is applied to the interior 
of the aircraft during routine maintenance, has the advantage that passengers are not 
directly exposed to chemical aerosols during flight, but there is potential that 
passengers may inadvertently come into contact with the insecticide as a consequence 
of touching treated areas. While individual countries can select which of these 
disinsection methods they want performed on aircraft entering their territory, the 
WHO specifies the type of insecticides that can be used. These chemicals are either 
pyrethrins, naturally occurring insecticides extracted from chrysanthemum flowers, or 
synthetic forms of pyrethrum called pyrethroids. 
 
Airport Malaria 
While the debate concerning the pros and cons of aircraft disinsection continues, 
evidence shows that mosquitoes and other insects imported in aircraft have been 
responsible for outbreaks of disease around airports. Between 1969 and 1999, 89 
cases of airport malaria (i.e. incidents of malaria in and around major airports in 
which people who have not recently travelled overseas are infected) were reported in 
12 countries around the world. These included cases at London Heathrow, Madrid, 
Paris Charles De Gaulle, Geneva, and Brussels. In 1994, six cases of airport malaria 
were recorded around Paris CDG. It was reported that all the afflicted individuals 
lived close to the airport but had neither travelled to a malarial area nor received a 
blood transfusion. It was believed the cases were the result of an infected mosquito 
flying out of an aircraft and biting them. Passengers and crew may also be at risk of 
contracting ‘runway malaria’ in certain areas as a consequence of being bitten by an 
infected mosquito while on the ground during a stopover. The need to keep airports 
free from mosquitoes and other pests therefore remains vital. 
 
Infestation and fumigation 
While reports of aircraft infestation by rodents, reptiles, or insects are unusual, they 
are not unheard of. Usually, the creatures enter an aircraft through open doors or 
access panels, are inadvertently loaded alongside catering supplies, or escape from 
cargo containers or passenger baggage. In the past, aircraft fumigation involved 
pumping toxic gases, such as methyl bromide or hydrogen cyanide into the aircraft, 
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but concerns about the use and potential side effects of these chemicals have led to 
them being replaced by carbon dioxide and more targeted pesticides. Nevertheless, 
fumigation remains expensive and time consuming, as the aircraft must be taken out 
of service for hours, if not days, at a time, and must be treated in a remote corner of 
the airport, well away from passenger areas. The emphasis is thus on stopping 
unwanted ‘passengers’ from gaining access to, and stowing away in, aircraft. As ever, 
prevention is better than cure. 
 
Contemporary health screening 
While the practise of screening passengers for infectious diseases at airports is not 
new, the emergence of new, increasingly virulent and drug resistant strains of 
bacterial and viral infection are leading to new procedures regarding passenger health 
screening at airports. In July 2003, the Taiwanese authorities required all inbound 
passengers arriving at their two international airports to complete a SARS Survey 
Form before landing and have their body temperature taken by a thermal imaging 
camera. Any passenger whose body temperature exceeded 37
o
C was subject to 
additional health checks. The screening programme helped identify numerous cases of 
fever and diagnosed several cases of imported dengue fever. Elsewhere, prospective 
long-term immigrants to certain countries are required to submit to chest x-rays to 
check for signs of tuberculosis or sign forms to state that they are free from infection. 
Other passengers, for example those travelling on religious pilgrimages to the Middle 
East, must be in possession of valid health and vaccination certificates before they are 
allowed to travel. However, while passengers using the ‘usual channels’ at major 
airports are intensively policed and often screened for signs of infection, those using 
smaller or unlicensed airfields, or those flying into a country illegally (in some cases 
smuggled in on aircraft literally ‘under the radar’) may undermine the effectiveness of 
international disease control measures.  
 
Rising numbers of air passengers also make it increasingly difficult to actively screen 
everyone for infection and individual passengers must take some responsibility for 
their health and mobility. However, the rise in demand for ‘exotic’ holidays to far-
flung destinations and the increase in the size and capacity of passenger aircraft mean 
that not only are more people being exposed to tropical diseases at their destination, 
but more people are being exposed to disease as a consequence of sitting in an aircraft 
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with hundreds of other people for hours on end, any one of whom may be carrying an 
infectious disease. 
